Assumptions rooted in Factoring and the Discrete the origin, nature, and uses of bilinear pairings, arguably Logarithm problem are interesting in that they tend to the newest and hottest toy in a cryptographer ' and Decision Diffie-Hellman (CDH and DDH), offers It can be said that much of contemporaneous cryp-us the option to work with either a computational or a tography can be traced to Shannon's legacy of "secrecy decisional complexity assumption, the latter being usesystems", an information theoretic foundation. To escape ful to build public-key encryption systems with formal from the one-time pad, however, it has become neces-proofs of security; by contrast, Factoring and RSA-like sary to appeal to a variety of computational complexity problems are essentially computational, and are thus notions, e.g., to leverage short secrets in order to protect inherently more suited for signature and authentication long messages. Modern cryptography is, in essence, a schemes although we note that the Random Oracle computational game of cat and mouse between honest heuristic blurs that disctinction, and exceptions abound. secret holders and resource-bounded adversaries.
II. BILINEAR GROUPS III. ALGEBRAIC REALIZATIONS
Before delving into the actual realization of bilinear Algebraic curves and elliptic curves in particular have groups and maps, it is helpful to understand why they provided an avenue for the construction of cryptographare so desirable in cryptography.
ically suitable bilinear pairings, known as the Weil and
For illustration, consider a cyclic group G, of (finite) the Tate pairings. In the next few paragraphs we give size or order n, such as the set Z, of integer residues a very brief overview of how these pairing come to modulo n. If we use the multiplication symbol ' ' to existence. denote the group operation (which in Z, is the arithmetic To start, consider a finite field (or Galois field) Eq addition modulo n), then we know that every element of size q, usually a large prime. Roughly speaking, an h C (G can be expressed as an integral power of some elliptic curve over the field Eq is defined by a bivariate fixed element g C (G called a generator of the group, i. e., equation in x and y, such as E : y2 = X3 + a x + b, 3a C E: g* g ... g = ga = g(a mod n) = h.
where a and b are constants in Eq. We can view a pair atimes (X,y) C EFq X Eq as representing the coordinates of a
In this context, the CDH problem is the task of point on the doubly periodic integer "plane" (or torus)
calculating gab given only g, ga, gb, and an implicit de-Eq X Eq. We say that such a point is on the curve if scription of Zn. The DDH problem is to decide whether its coordinates satisfy the curve equation in Eq. It turns or not h =a b in a given quadruple of group elements out that the set of points on the curve (to which we (g, ga, 9b, h The last step involves a bit of magic. Recall that we In spite of this ability, it is not obvious how one have identified two (distinct) subgroups of points on the would compute h from (g,, ga,gb) without knowing curve E, both of them having the same prime order p.
at least one of the exponents a and b; in fact, it is Consider two points U G E(Eq) and V C E(Eqk). In widely believed that this CDH-like problem is hard for general, any element g1 G G c E(Eq) can be expressed the bilinear pairings of cryptographic interest, which are as a linear combination of U and V, and the same is true based on algebraic curves. We shall give a very rough of any g2 e G c FE(Iqk). Since G and G without necessitating A or the linear coefficients. We BDH and D-BDH are direct analogues of CDH and remark that for k as previously defined, the extension DDH in non-bilinear groups, except that here a third field Fqk always has a multiplicative subgroup of order secret exponent is needed since it is easy to compute p; this subgroup is our target group (GT e[g, ]b from ga and fb. All of the above is true in general, so in that sense b) Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH): Given as input bilinear pairings are not hard to obtain. However, this g C G, and the powers of g C G to each of the exponents only works in practice if the embedding degree k is 1,a,a2, , a e C Z for some number e and secret a, it small. The reason is that elements of G are points is hard to find b C 7p and h C G such that ha+b = 9.
(X,Y) C Fqk X]Fqk, whose coordinates will be intractably Purported solutions are easy to verify by checking that difficult to represente and calculate with for large k. e[h, (fa) ()b] = e [g,g] . SDH was first stated in [8] .
Since a random curve generally produces extremely SDH is a Discrete Logarithm counterpart to Strong large embedding degrees, a lot of recent effort has been RSA. Both assumptions have in common that a probdedicated to devise clever ways to generate practical lem instance has not one but a very large number of curves, yielding large subgroups with tiny embedding admissible solutions. SDH, like S-RSA before it, has degrees such as k = 2 and 6 [5] , and 12 [6] .
found many application in signatures and authentication Lastly, we mention that it is sometimes possible to schemes. It has no obvious decisional version. obtain a modified "symmetric" pairing whose arguments c) Linear: On input g, ga, gb g xby EC G G it is are interchangeable and both live in the group G. The hard to compute gx+y C G (or to distinguish it from idea is to reduce this case to the earlier "asymmetric" random, in the decisional version of the assumption). case, by lifting one of the arguments from G into S Linear was originally proposed in [9] . using a homomorphic distortion function b: G --G Since (D-)Linear instances involve no elements of (not to be confused with the more commonly available (GT, the assumption remains meaningful in ordinary trace map : (G -> G, which goes in the other direction). non-bilinear groups. Its appeal in bilinear groups stems Distortion functions are guaranteed by a special algebraic from the design as a weakening of (DDH/)CDH that is structure, exemplified by the so-called supersingular believed to hold even in the presence of a bilinear map. curves that have enjoyed a recent bout of popularity in We note that many more complexity assumptions cryptographic circles for precisely that reason.
have been stated and used in the context of pairingsprobably more than in any other branch of cryptography.
IV. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
The flexibility to tailor complexity assumptions to build The upshot of the previous section is that the cryp-cryptosystems with novel properties has undoubtedly tographic pairing implementations that we know of, are been a major factor in the rapid rise of pairings. We shall functions of the form e[gi, 921 wAziX with Ai\ 1 V1 describe some of those in the remaining few sections.
for g1 = Uu1 Vvl and g2 = U2 VV2.
Although it is reasonable to be suspicious of assumpAs noted, the 2-by-2 determinant causes bilinearity. tions made for a single purpose, we note that in many Furthermore, since A appears in the exponent, it stands cases powerful supportive arguments can be made based to reason that a function that evaluates to woA should be on generic group structural arguments. In other words, hard to invert, for the same reason that vanilla Discrete properly constructed cryptosystems based on pairings Logarithm is presumed hard in the same groups.
can be impervious to (mathematical) attacks, unless the Similarly to (non-bilinear) groups in which the formu-underlying pairing realization itself has a vulnerability lation of stronger assumptions such as CDH and DDH independent of the cryptosystem.
V. IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION
Encr.: To encrypt a message for a user named ID, Public-key differs from secret-key encryption in that the sender picks a random r C 7p and uses the key used for encryption cannot feasibly be used for e [H [ID] , f]' as session key. The header h = g' decryption, which requires a separate key. The two keys is added to the ciphertext. are related "by birth" through the key pair generation Decr.: To decrypt a ciphertext with header h, the process; and obviously the encryption key must be made recipient recovers the session key as e[d, h], available to the encrypting party before the system can which will be correct if the identities match. be used. Usually, a public key is bound to her owner's This is a simplified description; in the real scheme legal name or other identifying information with a digital additional hash functions are needed in order for the signature issued by a trusted certificate authority. security proofs to go through. Nonetheless, the scheme is Identity-based encryption (IBE) is public key encryp-very simple to understand once we have abstracted away tion with a twist. Here, the public key can be any string, the notion of pairing. In practice, the requirement to hash such as the legal name of the recipient. The private key is into G, complicates matters with asymmetric pairings. generated from it by a central trusted authority (TA) who B. Boneh-Boyen (BB1) [12] holds a master secret key. To encrypt in such a system, The Boneh-Boyen system works well with the general one needs only to know the name of the recipient, and b m e G x a set of public system parameters that are common to resistan has function H from ideties to (a subsetiof all users under the purview of the TA. Since the public ore nohata ifu idnti are encodes integrs key does not functionally depend on the private key, the P'o sender need not wait for the recipient to send him her proposal for a simpler but less practical IBE based on Again, this is a simplified description. Here, the pria Factoring assumption [11] . The discovery of pairing-vate keys are randomized. This scheme appears more based IBE has spurred a great deal of research in this complicated than the previous one, but it is faster since new area, which in particular resulted in the invention all exponentiations are to fixed bases, and hence can be of a less demanding and more flexible paradigm [12] greatly optimized. that was also more secure: its distinct advantage was Much like BF, the BB1 scheme has been extended to admit a security reduction that did not rely on the in many ways to offer, e.g., hierarchical identities [13] , roandom oa heurisyr cticr improved security [14] , and threshold decryption [15] .
random oracle heuristic. We now describe the two main IBE schemes. Both schemes are secure under the BDH assumption, without random oracles in the case of BB1. Both can be A. Boneh-Franklin (BF) [7] made to conceal the recipient identity in addition to the The Boneh-Franklin system ideally necessitates a message, as well as to withstand active attacks.
"symmetric" bilinear map e: G' x G -> (ST (Cf PM11), Very recently, Boyen and Waters [16] built a fully and requires a "full domain" cryptographic hash function anonymous hierarchical IBE scheme, upon the Linear H from identities to elements of G, available to all. assumption. Systems that exploit stronger complexity Setup: The master secret is a random integer or C 7p. assumptions have also been suggested; these include
The public parameters are g and f = ga C (G. Boneh 
